



**Centre of Full Employment and Equity**

# PFI/PPP arrangements

## Some considerations?

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
<http://e1.newcastle.edu.au/coffee>

# The starting parameters ...

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
- What is role of government?
  - to maximise social welfare
  - this is different to maximising private welfare
- What do we mean by efficiency?
  - it requires that net social benefits are maximised
  - This is not the same thing as maximising net private benefits.

# Manifest policy failure ...



The Australian economy fails to generate enough employment...

# which leads to massive waste ...



- In pursuit of small (questionable) microeconomic gains we allow massive losses to persist in the form of macroeconomic inefficiency – labour underutilisation.
- This reality makes most of the PFI/PPP discussion about Value for Money pale into insignificance.
- But it gets worse – because the PFI/PPP agenda is also driven by false premises that further degrade the role of government in **maximising social welfare**.

# What our governments should do ...

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- Government should use its fiscal power to:
  - be a major employer **ensuring full employment**
  - to **maintain high quality public infrastructure**
- In the second role, governments face two questions:
  - What is the best way to provide for the rising demand for best practice public infrastructure?
  - What is the best way to gather the resources necessary to guarantee this provision?

# The public infrastructure challenge ...

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- Due to our **inefficient** constitution, state and local governments have to deliver most of the essential services but face constant revenue issues.
- There is a real case for realigning spending and taxing responsibilities to allow the federal sphere more influence.
- Why?
- The Federal government does not have a financial constraint and much of the PFI/PPP debate would be irrelevant if it was conducted at this level.



# Public provision of public infrastructure?

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
- Government should provide public infrastructure because of market failure considerations - existence of public goods, externalities and such does not support sufficient **private returns** from charges.
- The presence of natural monopolies will generate excessive prices and returns should a private supplier be present.
- Typically, public infrastructure services – generate benefits **across time** and **beyond the immediate users** (schools, hospitals, sewage, etc).

# What is the role of public infrastructure?

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
- Sometimes, socially optimal user charges are often too low for a private return to be generated (railways?)
- But public infrastructure investment promotes productivity and economic growth.
- Provides a fundamental training ground for skilled labour – [apprenticeships](#) etc...
- Beyond its economic contribution, public infrastructure provides a social fabric – social benefits.

# Government capital investment % GDP



Source: ABS Cat no. 5220.0, Allen Consulting (2003)

## The ugly side of fiscal consolidation



Source: ABS Cat no. 5220.0, Allen Consulting (2003)

# Myth of privatisation...

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
- It was argued that privatisation would create new employment opportunities with no net losses.
- Data clearly reveals this to be untrue.
- Large decline in public employment has not been taken up by an increased private employment growth rate.

# The costs of fiscal consolidation

<b>Category</b>	<b>2003 NSW Grade</b>	<b>2001 Australian Grade</b>	<b>Category</b>	<b>2003 NSW Grade</b>	<b>2001 Australian Grade</b>
National Roads	C+	C	Metropolitan Urban Potable Water	B-	not rated
State Roads	C+	C-	Non Metropolitan Urban Potable Water	C-	not rated
Local Roads	C-	D	Metropolitan Urban Wastewater	C-	not rated
Rail	D	D-	Non Metropolitan Urban Wastewater	C-	not rated
Electricity	B	B-	Stormwater	D	D

Source: <http://www.InfrastructureReportCard.org.au>

## Denial of fiscal opportunities – at State level



Source: Commonwealth Budget Paper 1, 2003, Allen Consulting (2003).

- Contractual partnerships between the public sector and the private sector to **finance**, **construct** and/or **operate** projects which would **normally be the responsibility** of the public sector.
- Key steps:
  - Private partner invests in public infrastructure
  - Contract extends to operation of the facility – usually with bundled services.
  - Government pays annual fees for capital and services which include risk premium, private profit margin.



- So various forms:
  - Design, construct and maintain (DCM)
  - Build, operate and transfer (BOOT)
- Questions about how much service delivery should government retain.
- Typically government is reduced to:
  - policy development, and
  - brokerage and management of contracts with private service delivery partners.

# Rationale for PFI/PPP arrangements

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- But typically debate is based on false premises.
- Federal level:
  - government is financially constrained.
  - borrowing drives up interest rates.
  - deficits imply higher future taxes.
  - surpluses facilitate private savings.
- State level:
  - government borrowing is bad – logic of AAA rating?
  - surpluses are efficient.

# Value for money (VFM)

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- Proponents of PFI/PPP arrangements argue that they offer **Value for Money** – an efficiency concept.
  - Lower construction costs
  - Lower operating costs
  - Higher quality services.
- Evidence from the UK - is mixed but generally does not support these alleged advantages across education, health and other sectors.

# The scarce funds myth ...

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- Government has ‘more funds’ available for other vital uses – service delivery etc.
  - this is a nonsense argument at Federal level
  - at state level it implies that private borrowing is better than public – again a nonsense argument.

# The financing myth

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- Critics often fail to make their case properly.
- They say that the private sector has to price its debt in the market whereas public debt prices at the long-term bond rate.
- There is typically a 3-5 per cent difference between private and public funds.
- Therefore, PFI can never be cheaper unless services (employment) are cut dramatically or construction quality reduced.

# Have to consider risk...

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- But the difference reflects project risk and lower public rate implies that government will rescue a failing project via drawing on consolidated revenue.
- Therefore PFI/PPP is constructed as an **efficient transfer of risks** from public to private.
- The gains are alleged to arise from the private sector being better able to manage risk – largely because they have a higher incentive to do so – private profit.
- PFI/PPP contracts can contain punitive terms to ensure profit is ‘earned’.

- Who ultimately bears the risk?
- The risk premium in private financing is based on the fact that a private entity can become bankrupt with its product and service exiting the market.
- Why should the government be risk-averse?
- With an essential public service it is a fantasy to say that the PFI/PPP contract transfers risk to the private sector.
- If the private partner defaults, the public always has to pick up the pieces.
- There is no real risk transferred.

# The refinancing dilemma...

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- Evidence from UK reveals that PFI partners profiteer from the 'risk' transfer component built into the contract payments.
- The private provider aims to minimise financing costs over the life of the contract.
  - early repayment
  - refinancing existing loan at lower interest rates.
- Risks are typically high in construction phases and drop to near zero once service operations begin.
- Private partner reduces costs by refinancing at lower rates once construction is completed.
- Who captures these gains?



# Evidence on refinancing

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- Major issue in the UK.
- Once case, a prison completed 5 months ahead of schedule and refinancing allowed private shareholders to increase returns from 16% to 39%.
- Massive public spending subsidy transferred to the private sector
- The public should ‘capture’ the benefits of the refinancing rather than the private sector.
- Private agent made the decision on the initial estimated internal rate of return.
- It is clear that the initial public decision to enter into the PFI/PPP agreement is flawed because the contract payment stream to the private partner is based on inflated present values.

- The public payments also include the profit margin.
- Why?
- Is ownership or management the key to sound project outcomes?
- This is a rehearsal of the privatisation debate which failed to show ownership mattered.

# Allen Consulting MMRF comparisons

Type of financing	NPV of GSP gains	% NPV gain over taxes	Annual Job Creation	% Job gain over taxes
Public Debt	\$13.0 billion	218 per cent	12684 jobs	581 per cent
SPV	\$10.9 billion	182 per cent	10749 jobs	492 per cent
Residential rates	\$7.3 billion	122 per cent	5881 jobs	269 per cent
Average aggregate state taxes	\$6 billion	0	2184 jobs	0
User charges	\$5.0 billion	86 per cent	3973 jobs	182 per cent
Producer levy	\$0.8 billion	14 per cent	minus 3103 jobs	minus 142 per cent

Simulations of benefits from \$5 billion investment over 5 years  
for a 15-year forecast period

# Allen Consulting conclusions...

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- Government at state and local levels should view that recapitalising our cities is essential to maintain and enhance their economic, social and environmental sustainability
- The case for the greater use of government debt is strong
- Fundamental public finance arrangements need to be revisited
- The trend towards ad hoc and wasteful infrastructure funding techniques should be halted.
- PFI/PPP arrangements - “changes are needed to make these approaches more workable.”

- Governments should use their fiscal powers to maximise social welfare – full employment and appropriate capital provision.
- There is no case for service delivery being part of PFI/PPP contracts.
- Construction should debt-financed.
- There is a sound case for government returning to construction – at least it should enforce apprenticeship clauses on private construction contractors.

**End of Talk**